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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsTHOMAS CHESTER PERRY,

Case No.
12611

Defendant-Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The defendant, Thomas Chester Perry, was convicted by a jury in the Fourth Judicial District Court
of the State of Utah of the crime of robbery in violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-51-1 (1953). The Honorable Joseph E. Nelson, Judge, presided.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On January 14, 1970, a jury found defendant
guilty of the crime of robbery. Defendant was sentenced to a term of five years to life.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks affirmance of defendant's •
conviction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hereinafter the transcript of the preliminary hear·
ing is referred to as "P.", the transcript of the trial ii
referred to as "T.", and the Record on Appeal is re·
f erred to as "R."

1

On the evening of December 12, 1968, defendant 1
and a companion forced themselves into the residence
of David Harness in Orem, Utah, at gunpoint. While
his companion held Mrs. Harness at gunpoint, de·
fondant forced l\Ir. Harness to drive him to the Allen's
Super Save Market in Orem, Utah, which Mr. Harness
managed. While at the store defendant, in the presence
and close proximity of four other witnesses and under
good lighting conditions, forced Mr. Harness to remore '
the contents of the Store's safe and place such in de· '
fendant's possession. During the course of the robbery i
both defendant and his companions not only were
armed, but also carried walkie talkies. Mr. and Mrs.
Harness and the other witnesses were told that if de·
fendant was interf erred with during the course of the
robbery, defendant's companion would be notified by
walkie talkie to kill Mrs. Harness and the two Harness
children. After defendant obtained the contents of the
safe he forced Mr. Harness to drive him back to the
1

3

Harness residence, where defendant and his companion tied and gagged Mr. and Mrs. Harness and fled.
itnesses testifying to these events are as follows: David Harness (P. 13-42; T. 23-40); Darlene
Harness (P. 42-63; T. 40-53); Clark Naylor (P. 6376; T. 67-74); Floyd Hallsey (P. 76-90; T. 53-62);
Ruth Hallsey (P. 90-98; T. 62-67); and Dean Olsen
\\

1

(T. 74-77).

Prior to the p r e 1 i m i n a r y hearing five of
these witnesses were shown approximately twentyseven pictures from which each of the five witnesses
positively identified the defendant as the person who
committed the robbery (P. 25-26, 52-55, 73-74, 108; T.
9). The photographs were not displayed in any particular order (P. 102); no single picture recurred and no
photograph was in any manner emphasized (P. 25, 5254, 73, 89, 96, 102; T. 8, 19). No communication was
made to the witnesses by the officer conducting the
photographic identification before the witnesses had
completed making their identifications. Each identification was conducted in the absence of the other witnesses.
A preliminary hearing was held on January 5,
1970, before the Honorable H. V. Wentz in City Court
of Orem, Utah. Defendant, then serving a sentence at
San Quentin Prison in California, was brought to Utah
and was present with counsel at that hearing. In the
course of the hearing each of five witnesses positively
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identified the defendant as the man they had seen in:
connection with the robbery of Allen's Super Save ,
Market.
Defendant was bound over to stand trial before the
Honorable .Joseph E. Nelson of the Fourth J udici~ '
District on a charge of committing the crime of rob· ,
bery. Defendant entered a motion to suppress the testi·
mony of the witnesses who testified at the preliminary
hearing ( R. 16; T. 7) , and a motion to dismiss the in· 1
formation for variance (T. 20, 78), both of which were
I
denied by the court. Defendant's motion for a directed
verdict was also denied ( T. 79). The jury entered a
verdict of guilty (R. 42) and the defendant was sen·
tenced to a term of five years to life to be served in
the Utah State Prison (R. 51).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE IDENTIFICATION OF DEFEND· !
ANT AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING'
WAS CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE V\TITH
LAW AND WAS NOT UNNECESSARILY
C 0 N D U C I V E TO IRREPARABLE .MIS·
TAKEN IDENTITY.
The standard for determining the illegality of an
identification elicited during a pretrial confrontation is
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that set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87
S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d ll99 ( 1967). In that case the
Court said that such an identification will constitute a
ground for reversal of conviction where, depending
upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
confrontation, the confrontation " ... was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification that [defendant] was denied due process of law." Stovall, supra at 302.
The preliminary hearing confrontation in the instant case was not so suggestive as to violate that
standard. From the preliminary hearing testimony of
the five identifying witnesses it is clear that each witness identified the defendant at the preliminary hearing prior to notice of and apart from any possible suggestive circumstances surrounding defendant's appearance at that hearing. Four identifying witnesses testified to the effect that their attention was so highly
focused upon the defendant's physical features when
he appeared initially at the hearing as to exclude
from their awareness any observation or sensation
which might have been prompted by the allegedly suggestive circumstances surrounding the introduction of
the defendant into the courtroom.
These witnesses testified explicitly that no obser\'ation of the handcuffs worn by the defendant was
made by them until after a positive identification had
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already been made in the mind of each (T. 12, 14-15,
52, 65, 73).

The detail, certainty and consistency of the testi·
mony adduced at the hearing from the identifying witnesses, both in identifying the defendant and in relating the elements of the robbery, supply further evidence that the alleged suggestiveness of the circumstances at the hearing did not influence the identification. Each witness testified in the absence of the other
witnesses; yet there was no conflict in their testimony.
Not one of the witnesses at the preliminary hearing experienced any difficulty in identifying the defendant.
Their identification was confident and unequivocal and
did not depend in any degree upon the allegedly sng·
gestive circumstances of the identification procedure.

1

Inasmuch as the defendant was represented by
counsel at the preliminary hearing, defendant's quotation from United States v. TYade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 ,
S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1027 ( 1967), at page 12 of his
brief is inapposite. The language quoted from that
opinion refers to the dangers which may result when a '
pre-trial lineup is conducted in the absence of defense
counsel.
For these reasons under the totality of the circum·
stances the identification which took place during the
preliminary hearing was not so suggestive that it tainted
~!'c in-court identification at trial.
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POINT II
THE IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDAXT AT TRIAL \VAS ARRIVED AT BY AP-

PROPRIATE AND LAWFUL MEANS FROM
SOURCES INDEPENDENT OF AND DISTINGUISHABLE FROl\I THE IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AT THE PRELIMIX ARY HEARING AND THE TRIAL COURT
PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE PRELIMINARY
HEARING TESTIMONY OF THE IDENTIFYING \VITNESSES AND DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
The United States Supreme Court has established
the rule that where a pre-trial identification by the
same eyewitness who offers identification testimony at
trial is violative of due process, the trial identification

may still be admissible if it has an independent source.
This rule was enunciated in Wong Swn v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441
( 1963) as follows:

" [ T] he more apt question ... is 'whether,
granting establishment of the primary illegality
the evidence to which instant objection is made
has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently dis-
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tinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'
McGuire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959)."
See also United States v. Wade, supra at 241; Gil·
bert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73, 87 S.Ct. 19.51,
18 L.Ed.2d 1178 ( 1967) ; Clemons v. United States,
408 F.2d 1230, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1968); State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah 2d 277, 279, 451 P.2d 786, 787 ( 1969).
The United States Supreme Court has also estab·
lished the related rule that a federal constitutional error
can be held harmless if a court is able to declare it harm·
less beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 70;i
( 1967). See also Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84
S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963).
Plaintiff maintains that, even assuming the estab·
lishment of the illegality of the preliminary hearing
identification, either the observation of the defendant ,
by the identifying witnesses at the time of the robbery,
or the later photographic identification of the defend·
ant by the same witnesses, is an independent source of
identification sufficient to purge the trial identifica·
tion of any taint caused by such prior identification.
Taken together these sources not only constitute ab·
solutely and unquestionably an independent source, but
also render the alleged illegality of the preliminary
hearing ha1mless error.
1

A
The testimony of the identifying witnesses at the
trial was not the direct result of the identification which
took place at the preliminary hearing and was not come
at by the exploitation of any illegality which might have
Leen associated with that identification. The identification at trial had an independent and primary source in
the observations made by the identifying witnesses at
the time the robbery was committed.
Each witness viewed the defendant for a considerable period of time under favorable conditions during the commission of the robbery. Mr. Harness, the
first identifying witness to testify at trial, observed the
<lefendant at close range for approximately one and a
half hours; that is, from the time the defendant forced
his way into the Harness residence at gunpoint (T. 25),
at between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m. (T. 42), until approximately 10 :50 ( T. 46), when the defendant fled from
the Harness residence following the robbery. Mr. Harness recounted in detail conversation had with the defendant and the actions and physical characteristics of
the defendant (T. 25-37). Mr. Harness observed the
defendant for at least one-half hour in the Harness
residence ( T. 42, 46) , presumably in ample light; for
several minutes while sitting on the same seat as the
defendant during the ride to and from the robbery site
in 1\Ir. Harness's automobile, for approximatelly 30
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minutes under adequate light ( T. 71) while at the robbery site; and again at the Harness home for sewrai
minutes upon returning from the place of the crime.
In addition, both )fr. and l\Irs. Harness must have
been prompted by a feeling of immense urgency to
focus their attention and powers of observation upon
the defendant, for it was their family and their lirn
which were most threatened and in very real danger.
They had great reason to establish in their minds a perfect picture of the man who so threatened them. They
<lid establish such a picture. The urgent circumstances
ensured the veraciousness and accuracy of that picture.
Mrs. Harness also testified in impressive detail at
the trial concerning the iclentity of the robber based
upon her observation at the time of the robbery (T. 4147). At trial, l\lrs. Harness identified the defendant
without any doubt as the person who held her and her
husband at gunpoint at their home ( T. 42), left with
her husband for the grocery store (T. 46), later re·
turned with her husband and bound and gagged her an<l
her husband at their home before fleeing ( T. 47). Alto(J'ether lVTrs. Harness observed the defendant for 30·
b
'
4_,5 minutes under the optimum conditions of her lighted
home. In testimony consistent with that of the other witnesses, she described in forrnidible detail defendant's
attributes, actions and conversation at the time of the
robbery.

I

1
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.Jlr. Hallsey offered further testimony substantiating the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery (T. 53-57). He observed the
defendant at the scene of the robbery for approximately one-half hour. l\Ir. Hallsey carefully studied the defendant while the robbery was in progress (T. 55). His
testimony corroborated that given by the other identifying witnesses, although he was examined at trial in their
absence .
.Hrs. Hallsey offered identifying testimony based
upon her eyewitness observation of the robbery. Shortly after defendant and l\Ir. Harness arrived at the
scene of the robbery Mrs. Hallsey was asked to join
them. Upon being made aware of what was transpiring, she spoke to the defendant face to face in an effort
to dissuade him from continuing further ( T. 64) .
Finally, Mr. Naylor, who served in the Air Force
as an agent in the Office of Special Investigations, also
testified conclusively concerning the identity of the defendant as the robber (T. 67-70). l\1r. Naylor observed
the defendant for approximately IO minutes as the robbery was in progress and came within three or four feet
of the defendant (T. 71). At the preliminary hearing
l\fr. Naylor testified that he carefully analyzed defendant's appearance during the robbery, stating at page
G9 of the preliminary hearing transcript:
" . . . [A]ll I could do is get a fix on
the man, and so I stood there staring at him
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trying not to be too obvious, but staring at
him for the length of time that it took for the
safe to be emptied and the instructions to go
on. And I would say this was at least eight
minutes or so, and so I was staring at this man
here trying to get a fix on how tall he was, how
m•.Ich he weighed, and so on and so on and so
on, what he looked like, what distinguishing
characteristics I could pick up and so on."
Plaintiff urges that the testimony discussed above,
dealing v.·ith the observations of the defendant by the 1
witnesses before, during, and after the time in which
the actual robbery was committed, conclusively demon· ,
strates that the trial identification was based upon ob·
servations made at the time of the robbery. Plaintif!
urges that such on-the-scene observation constituted a
source of reference independent from the identification
conducted at the preliminary hearing.
B
On-the-~cene obserYation was not the only inde·
pendent source of identification sufficient to purge the
preliminary hearing identification of any possible taint.
A photographic identification conducted between the
time of the offense and the time of the preliminary
hearing was also such an independent source.

The Supreme Court of the United States has explicitly recognized the importance and effectiveness of
identification by photograph. Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 381, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247
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( 1968). The Supreme Court has also established an explicit standard for determining whether a pretrial photographic identification was conducted in such a fashion
as to taint a subsequent identification at trial.
" [ C] onvictions based upon eyewitness
identification at trial following a pretrial
identification by photograph will be set aside
on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification."

Simmons, supra at 384. See also. Stovall v. Denno, 338
U.S. 293, 301-302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199
( 1967); People v. Evans, 39 Cal. 2d 242, 246 P. 2d
636 ( 1952) . By no stretch of the imagination did the
pretrial photographic identification fail to meet this
standard. Not one of the five factors cited by the Court
in Simmons as contributing to an incorrect identification was present in the instant photographic identification procedure. First, the witnesses obtained far more
than only a brief glimpse of the criminal, as recited at
Point I of plaintiff's brief. Second, the witnesses' onthe-scene identification was made under good conditions,
as recited in plaintiff's brief at Point I. Third, the
police did not display to the witnesses only the picture
of a single individual, nor did the picture of a single
individual recur in the series of pictures shown. (P. 2526, 52-55, 73-7 4, 89, 96, 102, T. 8, 19). Fourth, no

photograph in the series was in any way emphasized.
( P. 25, 52-54, 73, 89, 96, 102; T. 8, 19) . Fifth, in spite
of defendant's contentions at pages 10-18 of his brief
no improper suggestions were made by the police in
connection with the presentation of the photographs
to the witnesses.
•

I

I

This fifth possible danger is described in Simmons,
supra at 383, as follows:
"The chance of misidentification is also
heightened if the police indicate to the witness
that they have other evidence that one of the
persons pictured committed the crime."
Defendant points to a remark made to the identifying witnesses by Officer Pilkington after the witnessts
had completed the identification of defendant from
photographs. Officer Pilkington said, in effect, that
a similar crime had been committed in California (T. 9).
Defendant claims that this remark was suggestive and
likely to confirm a misidentification and was therefore
tantamount to the fifth danger cited in Simmons. (Brief 1
of Defendant, at 12). The Court in Simmons, however, ,
spoke of remarks by which "[t]he chance of misidentification is . . . heightened," not remarks which come
after the identification has been completed. A chance
of misidentification exists only prior to identification. I
In other words, the Supreme Court referred to the i'
danger brought about by remarks which precede the
identification.
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In the instant case the remark was made after each
witness had positively identified the defendant as the
person who committed the offense (P. 25-26, 52-55, 737 ,1; T. 9) . A remark, however suggestive it may be,
made after a properly structured and disciplined photographic identification procedure resulting in unequivocal positive identification does not constitute a danger
to accurate identification and does not offend the Simmons standard.
Finally, the remark made by Officer Pilkington
was not sufficiently suggestive to have tainted the photographic identification even had it been made to the
"itnesses prior to or in the course of that identification.
Officer Pilkington testified that he merely said that
a similar crime had been committed in California (T. 910). He did not say that one of the persons pictured
had committed that crime or had been convicted of that
crime; nor did he say that any person had even been
apprehended in connection with that crime. In fact, Officer Pilkington testified that at the time of the
photographic identification he himself did not know
whether a suspect had been apprehended in connection
with the California crime ( T. 9-10). In short, no indication was given to the witnesses that the police had
other evidence that one of the persons pictured committed the instant offense.
Plaintiff therefore maintains that the in-court
identification at trial wai not predicated in any degree
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upon the preliminary hearing identification, but was
instead predicated upon extensive observation of the
defendant under near-optimum conditions at the time of
the robbery, which observations constituted a fully suf.
ficient independant source of identification. Plaintiff
also maintains that the pretrial photographic identifica·
tion was properly conducted in deference to defendant's
constitutional rights and constituted a separate and a<l·
ditional independent source of identification. Plaintiff
further urges that these independent sources together
serve to purge the in-court identification at trial of any
taint which might possibly be attributed to the prelim·
inary hearing identification; and, that each independent
source alone so serves to purge the trial identification
of any such taint.
POINT III
NO

FATAL

VARIANCE

EXISTS BE·

TWEEN THE COMPLAINT AND THE IN·
FOR~1ATION AND THE DISTRICT COURT

PROPERLY REFUSED TO DISMISS THE
INFORMATION.
At Point II in his brief defendant alleges, with·
out reference to any pertinent statutory or judicial

)
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authority, a substantial variance in the offense charged
in the information with respect to the offense charged
in the complaint. Defendant further alleges that the
variance violates his constitutional rights, although he
does not specify which rights.
After reciting the name of the county in which
the offense occurred and the name of the offense, the
complaint charged the offense of robbery as follows:
"[T]he said Thomas Chester Perry, at
the time and place aforesaid, did then and
there unlawfully, wilfully, and feloniously and
with force of arms, take from the presence of
David Harness, and from the safe of Allen's
Super Save .Market ... the sum of approximately $5000.00 in cash and $5000.00 in
stamped checks .... " (R. 4).
The information charged the offense of robbery
as follows:
" [ T] he said Thomas Chester Perry did,
with force of arms, take personal property
from the possession of David Harness, against
his will. ( R. 13) .
No claim is made that the complaint and information did not fully apprise the defendant of the precise
charge against him by detailing the facts constituting
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the offense, which is the primary purpose of such in·
struments. State zi. Colston, 16 Utah 2d 89, 396 P. 2d
405 ( 1964). The only claim asserted is that the def endant was bound over for trial on a charge different from
that upon which he was tried, because the name of the
party from whose possession or presence the property
was taken was not stated in identical terms in both the
complaint and the information. HoweYer, that the complaint charged defendant with taking property "from
the presence of David Harness," and from the safe
of .Allen's Super Save l\larket," while the information
charged defendant with taking property "from the possession of David Harness" cannot by any means
be conceived as a variance denying defendant
his constitutional rights. It is not r e a s o n ab I y
possible to conceive that one charges an offense in any
material way different from the other. The mere omis·
sion in the information of the words "and from the safe
of Allen's Super Save Market," which were contained
in the complaint, certainly cannot be deemed a fatal
variance. Those words in the complaint were not necessary to charging defendant with the felonious taking
of property from the immediate presence of Mr. Har·
ness against his will. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-51-1
( 1953) (Defining robbery as the " . . . the felonious
taking of personal property in the possession of an·
other from his person or immediate presence, against
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.");

1

1
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-1 ( 1953) (Requiring that the
complaint state the " ... person against whom or against
whose property the offense was committed, if known");
and Utah Code Ann.§ 77-21-8 (1953) (Requiring that
the information state a definition of the offense which is
". . . sufficient to give the court and the defendant
notice of what offense is intended to be charged.")
See also State v. Landrnm, 3 Utah 2d 372, 284 P. 2cl
693, 695 ( 1955) (Short-form information stating that
defendants "robbed Joseph Shephard" held sufficient).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully urges that the preliminary
hearing identification of defendant was not conducted
in a suggestive fashion and that such identification did
not taint the later identification at trial. Plaintiff further urges that even given the illegality of the preliminary hearing identification and a tainting of the trial
identification, the latter has as independent sources both
the on-the-scene observations of the identifying witnesses
and a lawfully conducted photographic identification,
either of which was sufficient to purge the trial identification of any such taint.
Plaintiff urges that the offense charged in the information was the same offense charged in the complaint and that defendant was at all times apprised of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

20

Plaintiff therefore prays this Honorable Court to
affirm the conviction of clefenclant for the crime of
robbery.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY

Attorney General

DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent

